BYU Law Review
Volume 2005 | Issue 6

Article 4

12-18-2005

Architecture as Art? Not in My Neocolonial
Neighborhood: A Case for Providing First
Amendment Protection to Expressive Residential
Architecture
Janet Elizabeth Haws

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons
Recommended Citation
Janet Elizabeth Haws, Architecture as Art? Not in My Neocolonial Neighborhood: A Case for Providing First Amendment Protection to
Expressive Residential Architecture, 2005 BYU L. Rev. 1625 (2005).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2005/iss6/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

4HAWS.FIN.DOC

3/14/2006 5:22:05 PM

Architecture as Art?
Not in My Neocolonial Neighborhood:
A Case for Providing First Amendment Protection to
Expressive Residential Architecture
I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1960s in Landue, Missouri, Demiter and Joan Stoyanoff
wanted to build a pyramid-shaped home with a flat roof, triangular
windows, and doors positioned on the corners of the home. 1 Although
the Stoyanoffs’ futuristic home conformed to all of the city’s building
and zoning requirements, 2 the architectural review board denied the
couple’s request for a building permit because the home failed to
“conform to certain minimum architectural standards of appearance and
conformity with surrounding structures.” 3 The board stated that its
purpose was to prohibit “unsightly, grotesque and unsuitable structures”
like the Stoyanoffs’ proposed home. 4 Landue’s mayor defended the
board’s decision and added that the Stoyanoffs’ design was “in fact a
monstrosity of grotesque design,” 5 damaging to adjoining property
values, and inapposite with the French Provincial, English Tudor, and
Colonial architecture of the community. 6 The couple subsequently
appealed the board’s decision and won at the state circuit court. 7

1. Missouri ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Mo. 1970).
2. Id. at 306.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 307.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 308. The trial court initially found that the denial of the building permit was in
violation of Missouri’s takings clause. Id. at 306. The Building Commissioner, the individual
ultimately responsible for issuing building permits, appealed the decision. Id. The case eventually
reached the Missouri Supreme Court, at which point the Stoyanoffs argued that the architectural
review board was not authorized by Landue’s enabling statute. The relevant sections of the enabling
statute authorized the community to promote the “health, safety, morals and . . . general welfare of
the community” through the enactment of certain zoning ordinances. Id. at 308 (quoting MO. REV.
STAT. § 89.020 (1959)). The statute required that zoning ordinances be consistent with the
community’s comprehensive plan and give “reasonable consideration, among other things, to the
character of the district.” Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 89.020 (1959)). The Stoyanoffs further
argued that the ordinance creating the architectural review board was an “unreasonable and arbitrary

1625

4HAWS.FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/14/2006 5:22:05 PM

[2005

Applying rational basis review, the Missouri Supreme Court 8 reversed
and held that the aesthetic determinations of the architectural review
board were consistent with the city’s interest in protecting the “general
welfare of the community.” 9
If the court’s analysis were applied to a few imagined variations of
the Stoyanoffs’ design, the results would be troubling from a First
Amendment perspective. If the Stoyanoffs’ pyramid were expanded one
hundred feet and transported to Paris, it would evoke the architectural
artistry of I.M. Pei’s Louvre entrance. Shrunk to tabletop size, it becomes
sculpture. These examples not only beg the Dadaists’ question: what is
art, they also raise the question of whether residential architecture 10

exercise of the police power (as based entirely on aesthetic values).” Id. at 308. The ordinances in
question require that the architectural review board ensure that new buildings “maintain ‘conformity
with surrounding structures’ [and] . . . ‘conform to certain minimum architectural standards of
appearance.’” Id. at 310. The ordinance continued that “unsightly, grotesque, and unsuitable
structures, detrimental to the stability of value and the welfare of surrounding property, structures,
and residents, and to the general welfare and happiness of the community, be avoided, and that
appropriate standards of beauty and conformity be fostered.” Id. at 310. Furthermore, they argued
that the enforcement of these ordinances was an “unlawful delegation of legislative powers (to the
Architectural Board).” Id.
8. Id. at 310. The court applied rational basis scrutiny, which means that a legislative ruling
can only be reversed when the result is “oppressive, arbitrary or unreasonable” or conflicts with “a
valid preexisting nonconforming use.” Id.
Generally, appeals courts review zoning decisions under rational basis scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Seabrook Island Property Owners Ass’n v. Marshland Trust, Inc., 596 S.E.2d 380, 383-84 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2004). When First Amendment rights are implicated, however, a higher degree of judicial
scrutiny is generally required. Strict scrutiny is applied when the governmental action regulates the
specific content of the speech. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)
(striking down a statute prohibiting indecent interstate commercial telephone calls because the
statute was not narrowly tailored to the state’s compelling interest). Intermediate scrutiny generally
applies when the First Amendment is implicated by a content-neutral statute which limits expressive
conduct. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (“[A] regulation of the time,
place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate,
content-neutral interests but . . . it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing
so.”).
9. Stoyanoff, 458 S.W.2d at 308.
10. This Comment is limited to residential architecture and does not extend to commercial
architecture. Speech in one’s home deserves higher First Amendment protection than commercial
speech. See infra note 166–67 and accompanying text; Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) (“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”). Furthermore, the
government has an important, long-standing interest in regulating community public areas and
skylines given the high number of people who see these architectural forms compared to those who
see residential architecture. See infra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
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should receive the same level of First Amendment protection afforded
other expressive art forms. 11
In the First Amendment landscape, protection for expressive
residential architecture remains undeveloped territory. 12 No court has
explicitly considered free speech concerns in cases of residential
architecture. This reality is particularly surprising considering that courts
have provided First Amendment free speech protections for sexuallyoriented businesses, 13 abstract sculpture, 14 and, ironically, semipermanent homes built to protest homelessness policies. 15
This Comment argues that residential architecture is an expressive
art form, thus passing the threshold inquiry for expressive conduct under
First Amendment free speech analysis. Upon passing this initial inquiry,
expressive residential architecture would have the presumption of First
Amendment protection. According to free speech jurisprudence for
expressive conduct, a court would then be required to apply intermediate
scrutiny to aesthetic zoning decisions, thereby creating a better balance
between a homeowner’s expressive interests and a state’s interests in
regulation. Nevertheless, as this Comment illustrates, weighing a

11. See infra Part III.A.
12. Dissenting judges have argued against zoning regulations on expressive grounds without
any real indication that the plaintiffs initially based their claim on the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 192 N.E.2d 74, 78 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963). There have been very
few First Amendment challenges to zoning ordinances. In Burke v. City of Charleston, a visual artist
who had painted a mural on a building in Charleston’s historic district challenged the decision of the
architectural review board to remove the mural, but was found to lack standing. 139 F.3d 401, 403
(4th Cir. 1998). In Bohannan v. City of San Diego, a commercial property owner’s free speech claim
challenging zoning in a historic district was summarily dismissed. 106 Cal. Rptr. 333, 339 (Ct. App.
1973). Zoning ordinances that dictate the placement of newspaper racks have been challenged and
upheld under the First Amendment. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750,
772 (1988). Additionally, churches have challenged zoning ordinances under both the Free Exercise
and Speech Clauses as well as state statutes protecting these important rights. See St. Bartholomew’s
Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (1990); Martin v. The Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 747 N.E.2d 131 (Ma. 2001) (finding that a height
restriction on an LDS temple was in violation of a Massachusetts statute prohibiting zoning
restrictions on religious structures).
13. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. Am.
Mini Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. 50, 80 (1976); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
14. See United States ex rel. Radich v. Criminal Court, 385 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
quoted in Galina Krasilovsky, A Sculpture Is Worth a Thousand Words: The First Amendment
Rights of Homeowners Publicly Displaying Art on Private Property, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
521, 527 (1996).
15. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (analyzing a proposed
protest of homelessness through the construction of a tent city under the auspices of the First
Amendment).
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community’s legitimate interests, which may be affected by atypical
architecture, against a future homeowner’s expressive interests is
particularly difficult.
Although surmountable, architecture’s unique nature creates
unprecedented challenges in the application of the Court’s expressive
conduct jurisprudence. For instance, because architecture is an
immovable and lasting structure, the state has an interest (of debatable
importance) in protecting the aesthetics of a community over the dictates
of an individual property owner. Permanence also distinguishes
architecture from other areas of free speech protection, so the application
of precedent is difficult. Additionally, because the medium and message
of architectural expression are inextricable linked, 16 writing contentneutral regulations and providing reasonable time, manner, and place
accommodations are difficult. These complexities may be the unwritten
subtext for why courts have not applied First Amendment protection to
residential architecture.
The importance of individual expression, however, should outweigh
these judiciable difficulties. Individual expression is such a bedrock
principle of our democratic system that explaining its importance takes
on the tautological feel of a playground response: citizens should be able
to express themselves because it is a free country. Not only is individual
expression essential for a well-functioning democratic system, its
protection under the First Amendment ensures that minority views are
not unduly suppressed by the dictates of the majority, thus ensuring an
open and vibrant dialogue. Beyond its political justifications, selfexpression is innately valuable to individual development and selfrealization. 17 Furthermore, unexplained categorical limitations on the
application of First Amendment protections skew the balance of power
between the government and its citizens.
This Comment imagines the implications of altering the balance of
power between government regulation and individual expression by
taking two aesthetic zoning ordinances through the course of an
expressive conduct inquiry. This Comment first considers ordinances
prohibiting excessive architectural similarity or difference with the
surrounding community. It argues that excessive similarity or difference
ordinances are unconstitutional content-based restrictions on free

16. Samuel E. Poole III, Architectural Appearance Review Regulations and The First
Amendment: The Good, The Bad, and The Consensus Ugly, 19 URB. LAW. 287, 312–13 (1987).
17. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 592–93 (1982).
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expression. It next considers ordinances requiring the maintenance of a
community architectural style. This Comment argues that community
architectural style regulations, while content neutral, are constitutionally
precarious when balanced against a future homeowner’s free speech
rights.
Part II of this Comment discusses the history and legitimacy of
aesthetic regulations and defines the two types of regulations on which
this Comment will focus. Part III follows the two architectural
regulations through a First Amendment challenge under the rubric of
expressive conduct. Part IV discusses the policy benefits of extending
free speech protections to residential architecture and guaranteeing it
intermediate scrutiny. Finally, Part V offers a brief conclusion and
suggests that evaluating aesthetic regulations under intermediate First
Amendment scrutiny creates a better balance between individual
expression and community interests.
II. BACKGROUND: GENERAL WELFARE AND
AESTHETIC REGULATIONS
Concerns about safety, morality, health, and the general welfare
traditionally bound the police power of municipalities. However, courts
have more recently expanded the interpretation of the general welfare to
uphold municipal ordinances based solely on aesthetic considerations.
Challenges to aesthetic zoning ordinances are currently analyzed under a
rational basis review.
A. Beauty and the General Welfare: The Bounds of the Police Power
The Supreme Court’s holding in Berman v. Parker 18 expanded the
traditional understanding of the police power’s general welfare provision
to include aesthetic considerations and thereby gave municipalities the
right to pass aesthetic zoning ordinances.
In the past, a municipality’s concern for “public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare”—all appropriate reasons for a state or local
legislative body to exercise the police power—provided the justification
for comprehensive zoning ordinances. 19 When these concerns were
present, courts granted great deference to municipalities as “the main
guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation.” 20 Prior
18. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
19. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).
20. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
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to Berman, courts found that zoning ordinances based solely on
aesthetics were beyond the bounds of the police power. 21 One early
twentieth-century court even declared that “[a]esthetic considerations are
a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity, and it is
necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the police power.” 22
However, courts had frequently upheld municipal ordinances where an
aesthetic component was coupled with health or safety concerns. 23
With Berman, the Supreme Court expanded the traditional
understanding of the general welfare to justify government action based
solely on aesthetic considerations. 24 The Court upheld the validity of a
Washington D.C. urban redevelopment act that called for the
condemnation of the appellants’ department store in the interest of
recapturing a neighborhood from urban blight. 25 Ironically, the
legislative action upheld in Berman was strongly founded in concern for
“public health, safety, morals, and welfare,” 26 yet the Court’s expansive
language defining the general welfare has since been used to uphold
ordinances addressing purely aesthetic concerns:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. 27

21. See, e.g., City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 62 A.
267, 268 (N.J. 1905), overruled by State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 416 A.2d 821 (1980).
22. Shawn G. Rice, Comment, Zoning Law: Architectural Appearance Ordinances and the
First Amendment, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 439, 443–44 (1993) (quoting Paterson Bill Posting, 62 A. at
268).
23. See, e.g., People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272 (N.Y. 1963), appeal dismissed Stover v. New
York, 375 U.S. 42 (1963). The clothesline protest of the petitioners was criminalized by a zoning
ordinance preventing clotheslines in front of homes. The court bolstered its justification for the
ordinance by citing concerns about safety and visibility for traffic. However, it is very likely that the
city’s real concerns were aesthetic since the ordinance was passed after the petitioners protest began,
and the restrictions on clotheslines seemed only to target the protest. Furthermore, the majority
seemed most concerned with the property values and the offended “sensibilities” in the community.
Id. at 274.
24. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
25. Id. at 34–35.
26. Id. at 31; see also id. at 32–35; Kenneth Regan, Note, You Can’t Build That Here: The
Constitutionality of Aesthetic Zoning and Architectural Review, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1013, 1026
(1990).
27. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (internal citation omitted). Berman has been used extensively to
justify broad legislative power in the face of Takings Clause challenges. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of
New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2663–64 (2005).
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Since the Court’s expansive statement in Berman, aesthetic
considerations have been a starting point for many zoning ordinances, 28
primarily because of municipalities’ concerns about the derivative effects
of aesthetics on property values and the “comfort and happiness of the
neighborhood residents.” 29 For instance, within twenty years of Berman,
well over 500 communities had architectural review boards. 30 While
some jurisdictions have declined to extend Berman’s rationale and have
continued to tie aesthetic concerns to the more traditional police power
interests, 31 others have used Berman’s expansive definition of the
general welfare to regulate solely on the basis of aesthetic
considerations. 32 Confusion persists in part because in 1984 the Supreme
Court declined to hear an Ohio case that could have shed light on
whether Berman’s expansive language definitely applied to architectural
review. 33
Absent a reason for closer judicial scrutiny (a statute prohibiting a
steeple on a church, for example), zoning ordinances are evaluated under
rational basis review. This standard only requires that the statute bear
some relationship to the purposes of the police power—namely, health,
safety, morality, and the general welfare—and is neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable. 34 Despite varying understandings of the scope of the
general welfare, the police power clearly gives local governments
significant power to regulate the aesthetics of residential building.

28. Berman v. Parker marked a fundamental shift in land use law and raised a flood of
administrative and legislative actions to protect historic landmarks and to instigate urban renewal.
Scott Schrader, Book Review, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (1991) (reviewing JOHN J. COSTONIS,
ICONS AND ALIENS: LAW, AESTHETICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE (1989) (noting that “in no
other area of planning law has the change in judicial attitudes been so complete”)).
29. Stoyanoff v. Berekeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 310 (Mo. 1979) (quoting State ex rel. Civello v.
City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271 (1923)).
30. Rice, supra note 22, at 446; see also Bachman v. State, 359 S.W.2d 815, 817 (1962)
(acknowledging the trend towards upholding ordinances based solely on aesthetics, but still striking
down an aesthetic ordinance as arbitrary and unreasonable). Despite its expansive language, the
Court upheld the police power in Berman under traditional justifications like health and safety. See
Berman, 348 U.S. at 23–33 (discussing the effect of urban blight on the living conditions and health
of residents).
31. Regan, supra note 26, at 1014 n.12.
32. Id. at 1015 n.13.
33. Vill. of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 852 (Ohio 1984), appeal dismissed, 467
U.S. 1237 (1984).
34. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (7th ed. 1999) (“Police Power”).
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B. Aesthetic Regulations
Because of the low level of judicial scrutiny applied to zoning
ordinances, ill-conceived aesthetic regulations remain unchallenged or
are easily upheld. Communities can enact several types of aesthetic
regulations. 35 This Comment focuses on the following two types of
aesthetic regulation: (1) regulations that prohibit excessive architectural
similarity or difference, and (2) regulations that demand conformity to a
community architectural style. 36 Compliance with these types of
aesthetic zoning ordinances is generally determined by an architectural
review board. 37 These boards are usually comprised of citizens with “art,
architecture, [or] planning” experience. 38 Their decisions sometimes
come under judicial fire, even under rational basis scrutiny, when vague
ordinances give them too much power and thereby result in arbitrary
determinations. 39 However, many of these ordinances are either
unchallenged or upheld, and they effectively function to limit
architectural variances in communities. A basic understanding of these
two aesthetic regulations will help illuminate both the necessity and
difficulty of applying First Amendment protection to residential
architecture.
1. Ordinances prohibiting excessive similarity or difference with
surrounding residences
Municipalities pass excessive similarity 40 or difference 41 ordinances
for a two-fold purpose: (1) to prevent the spread of indistinguishable

35. Historic landmark regulations, ordinances prohibiting junkyards, and billboard and sign
regulations all fall under the category of aesthetic ordinances. See Poole, supra note 16, at 295, 326.
36. Categorical distinctions between these two types of ordinances were adopted for
organization purposes in this Comment. In reality, some communities’ aesthetic ordinances seem to
combine the two. Furthermore, some courts may use concerns about a building’s similarity or
difference with surrounding structures to uphold a building permit denial under a more general
aesthetic zoning ordinance. See infra notes 48–61 and accompanying text.
37. Poole, supra note 16, at 292–94.
38. Julie A. Tappendorf, Architectural Design Regulations: What Can a Municipality Do To
Protect Against Unattractive, Inappropriate, and Just Plain Ugly Structures?, 34 URB. LAW. 961,
965 (2002).
39. Id. at 965–66. See supra text accompanying note 34.
40. Tappendorf, supra note 38, at 961 n.2.
41. Id. at 961.
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tract housing, 42 and (2) to prevent nonconforming architectural designs
such as the Stoyanoffs.’ 43 A former architectural design ordinance for
Lake Forest, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago, provides a quintessential
example of an excessive similarity or difference regulation. 44 The
ordinance provided,
The City Council hereby finds that excessive similarity, dissimilarity or
inappropriateness in exterior design and appearance of buildings . . . in
relation to the prevailing appearance of property in the vicinity thereof
adversely affects the desirability of immediate and neighboring areas
and impairs the benefits of occupancy of existing property in such
areas, impairs the stability and taxable value of land and building in
such areas, prevents the most appropriate use of real estate and the most
appropriate
development
of
such
areas
. . . and destroys a proper balance in relationship between the taxable
value of real property in such areas and the cost of the municipal
services provided therefor. 45

42. Id.; see also Melissa Westphal, Byron Growth: Finding Balance, ROCKFORD REGISTER
STAR, Mar. 23, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 16592363 (discussing a city’s attempts to avoid
neighborhood monotony by passing zoning ordinances prohibiting architectural similarity).
43. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
44. Poole, supra note 16, at 305.
45. Id. (quoting LAKE FOREST, ILL., BUILDING CODE ch. 9, § 9.107 (1979)). Lake Forest
adopted new architectural design ordinances in 2003. The new ordinance requires that new buildings
be designed “within the context of the established surrounding neighborhood, preserve the character
of the community, protect the unique aspects that distinguish neighborhoods from each other,
provide for a diversity of house sizes at various price points, and maintain and enhance property
values.” LAKE FOREST, IL., BUILDING CODE § 9-86 B (2003), available at
http://www.cityoflakeforest.com/pdf/cd/bsord.pdf. The city considers the “surrounding
neighborhood” as the block in which the proposed home is located, and requires that proposed
designs consider “[t]he general character of the larger neighborhood, two blocks in each direction.”
Id. The Building Review Board responsible for permit approval would consider, among other things,
how well the exterior elements of the proposed design conformed to the “context of the surrounding
neighborhood.” Id. They would also consider whether the building was consistent with “a chosen
style of architecture and the surrounding area.” Id.
The city takes care to remark that these requirements are “not intended to limit creativity
or restrict the options of architectural styles.” Id. Although this new ordinance avoids explicit
language prohibiting excessive architectural similarity or difference, it is functionally equivalent to
the previous ordinance. Unless Lake Forest has a neighborhood reserved for eclectic architecture,
homes like the Stoyanoffs’ would still be excluded from the community because of nonconformity
with the surrounding neighborhood.
For an additional example of an excessive difference ordinance, see Rice, supra note 22, at
439 (quoting State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 69 N.W.2d 217, 219 (Wis.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955)).
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On its face, this ordinance prohibits excessive architectural similarity
and dissimilarity for property value purposes in addition to purely
aesthetic purposes. 46 With this ordinance, however, a possible decrease
in property values would be intractably tied to the aesthetic tastes of the
majority. The city council perceives that property values would drop
solely because of future homeowners’ distaste for nonconforming design.
While property values may clearly be an important governmental
interest, as discussed further below, the justification is problematic from
a First Amendment perspective because it creates the possibility that
minority interests are trumped by majoritarian tastes. 47
Courts have struck down many ill-conceived ordinances requiring
architectural similarity or difference under rational basis review. 48
Similar ordinances, however, have been upheld and have consequently
denied homeowners the opportunity to realize their architectural
vision. 49 The most famous case illustrating this point is Reid v.
Cleveland Heights, in which the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld, under
rational basis review, the denial of a building permit to a property owner
intent on building a modern, modular glass home in a suburb of
“dignified, stately and conventional structures.” 50 The architectural

46. Most aesthetic regulations are tied to property value. See Rice supra note 22, at 447.
(citing NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 71C.01,
57 (1988)).
47. In short, the city’s end—maintaining property values—may be legitimate, but the
means—restricting expressive architecture—may be an illegitimate restraint on free speech. See
infra Part III.D.1 discussing the First Amendment’s important role in protecting indecent or
offensive speech from censure precisely because of its unpopularity.
48. John Nivala, Constitutional Architecture: The First Amendment and the Single Family
House, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 291, 331–33 (1996) (describing the illegitimate regulations and
actions taken by communities in the interest of aesthetics.); see R.S.T. Builders, Inc. v. Vill. of
Bolingbrook, 489 N.E.2d 1151, 1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (rejecting architectural review board
permit denial, claiming the board wanted “shutters put on the windows, lights on the outside,
aluminum siding, a brick veneer front, and a two-car garage,” which overall was too much
discretion); Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Vill. of Olympia Fields, 244 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ill. App. Ct.
1968) (ordinance broad and arbitrary); Morristown Road Assoc. v. Mayor, 394 A.2d 157 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978) (vague ordinance); Hankins v. Borough of Rockleigh, 150 A.2d 63 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959) (indicating the aesthetic ordinance was too broad considering the
architectural variance in the community); De Sena v. Vill. of Hempstead, 379 N.E.2d 1144 (N.Y.
1978) (denying a building permit to an owner who wanted to build a house styled after a bowling
alley even though the community didn’t have an aesthetic ordinance).
49. See Wieland, 69 N.W.2d at 219.
50. Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 192 N.E.2d 74, 77 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) (Corrigan,
J., dissenting); Id. at 76. The dissent described the home as
a flat-roofed complex of twenty modules, each of which is ten feet high, twelve feet
square and arranged in a loosely formed “U” which winds its way through a grove of

1634

4HAWS.FIN.DOC

1625]

3/14/2006 5:22:05 PM

First Amendment Protection for Residential Architecture

review board assessing the application had broad discretion to protect
property, “maintain the high standards of the community,” 51 and
preserve property value through the application of “proper architectural
principles.” 52 Despite the building plan’s compliance with the zoning
requirements for the residential district, 53 the board denied the building
permit because the proposed design failed to conform to the design of
other homes in the community. 54 The reviewing court noted additional
reasons for the denial of the building permit, including possible effects
on adjacent lots and property values without any justifying language or
evidence from the architectural review board. 55 The proposed home
would have cost approximately as much to build as surrounding houses,
so the board’s decision was not based on the possibility of depressed
property values. 56 Still, under rational basis review, concrete evidence
affirming the validity of the government’s justifications for a statute is
not required. The court ultimately held that the architectural review
board’s aesthetic rationale was consistent with the expansive definition
of the general welfare found in Berman v. Parker. 57
The impassioned dissent championed the artistic vision of the
homeowner and architect. The dissenting judge felt the majority’s
property values argument masked a judgment based purely on taste. 58
trees. About sixty percent of the wall area of the house is glass and opens on an enclosed
garden; the rest of the walls are of cement panels. . . . [The garage and the house], with
their associated garden walls, trellises and courts, form a series of interior spaces and
exterior spaces, all under a canopy of trees.
Id.
51. Id. at 76.
52. Id. at 78 (quoting CITY OF CLEVELAND HEIGHTS, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES §
137.05).
53. Id. at 79. During an interrogation, a member of the Board of Architectural Review stated
that the building permit was denied solely because of non-conformity with the surrounding
structures, not because the design violated the building code. Id.
54. Id. Interestingly, the ordinance creating the Board of Architectural Review never
mentioned a prohibition on excessive similarity or difference. Still, the Board and reviewing court
seemed to find that Ms. Reid’s home failed to “maintain high character of community development”
and conform to “proper architectural principles” because of its dissimilarity with the surrounding
neighborhood. Id. at 76, 77–78.
55. Id. at 76.
56. Id. at 79. A member of the Board of Architectural Review denied that their decision was
based on the possibility of market-value depreciation, stating instead that the home was in the “same
class cost-wise as those in the neighborhood.” Id.
57. Id. at 78.
58. Id. at 80–81. The dissent quoted the deposition from a member of the architectural review
board illustrating that the board based its decision entirely on its dislike of the proposed design. Id. at
79.
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Despite the majority’s contention that the modern home would be
inconsistent with the surrounding neighborhood, the dissent found no
predetermined architectural style in the community, making the lack of
conformity argument ill-founded. 59 Finally, he argued against
prohibitions on excessive difference with the surrounding community in
favor of individual expression. He explained,
Should the appellant be required to sacrifice her choice of architectural
plan for her property under the official municipal juggernaut of
conformity in this case? Should her aesthetic sensibilities in connection
with her selection of design for her proposed home be stifled because
of the apparent belief in this community of the group as a source of
creativity? Is she to sublimate herself in this group and suffer the
frustration of individual creative aspirations? 60

Clearly, the dissenting judge’s answer to these questions is an
emphatic no. In his view, the architectural review board’s decision, based
solely on irrational aesthetic considerations, failed rational basis
scrutiny. 61 Despite championing individual expression, the dissenting
judge never explicitly considered the free speech interests affected by
Ms. Reid’s powerlessness to build her modern home. In fact, no court
has applied First Amendment free speech scrutiny to residential
architecture.
2. Ordinances requiring conformity to an existing community
architectural style
Ordinances requiring new buildings to conform to an existing
community architectural style are marked by planning and forethought.
A carefully planned interest in preserving the aesthetics of the
community creates a weightier justification for state action in an
expressive conduct balancing test.
Coral Gables, Florida, is an example of a city that has a regulation to
preserve the community architectural style. George Merrick, the
developer of Coral Gables, Florida, envisioned creating “America’s most
beautiful suburb.” 62 In the early 1920s, he began meticulously designing
the community, down to a designated home style for each lot. 63
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
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Restrictive covenants, which ensure that the original character of each lot
remained intact, were initially included in each property deed, and these
covenants were later codified in the community’s charter and zoning
ordinances. 64 A 1937 zoning ordinance dictated specific requirements
for color, texture, construction techniques, and the design and location of
fences. 65 Furthermore, Coral Gables established an architectural review
board to ensure that new building adequately “preserve the traditional
aesthetic treatment and excellence of design in the community.” 66 As of
yet, no one has presented a legal challenge to the decisions of Coral
Gables’s architectural review board. 67
When communities attempt to create architectural conformity in preexisting neighborhoods, however, the regulation is vulnerable to legal
challenge, even under rational basis scrutiny. For instance, in Hankins v.
Borough of Rockleigh, a New Jersey superior court overturned the city’s
denial of a building permit to a couple proposing to build a modern, flatroofed home. 68 A Rockleigh ordinance required new and renovated
homes to conform to either an early American design or the surrounding
architectural style and rural setting of the town. 69 In pursuit of this
vision, the town expressly banned modern, flat roofs on new buildings. 70
The ordinance failed rational basis review because the town had no
preconceived architectural structure. Its existing architectural style was
so eclectic that many of the town’s existing structures would have also
violated the ordinance. 71
One could argue that, given holdings like Rockleigh, greater judicial
scrutiny for aesthetic zoning regulations is unnecessary; however, a
slight shift in the facts could easily have lead to the opposite outcome. 72
This degree of uncertainty is precisely why intermediate scrutiny is

64. Id. at 301.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 301–02 (quoting CORAL GABLES, FLA., ORDINANCE No. 1525 (1966) (as amended
1983).
67. Id. at 302–03 (“[C]hallenges are rare and . . . most of the (infrequent) complaints
. . . come from citizens objecting to the review board’s laxity.”).
68. 150 A.2d 63, 66 (1959).
69. Id. at 64.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 66 (“Half the old-style houses are already partly out of their original architectural
design because of . . . flat-roofed extensions. There are in existence almost as many structures . . .
fully out of character with the architectural restrictions for dwellings set forth in the ordinance as
those which comply with them.”)
72. See infra notes 49–61 and accompanying text.
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required to protect the expressive interests at stake in some residential
architecture. The balance of this Comment considers the possible effects
of applying free speech jurisprudence to residential architecture. The
issues inherent in experimental, modern, or downright ugly residential
architecture are quite complex, and individual property owners may not
always prevail. Still, providing First Amendment protections to
expressive residential architecture creates a better balance between
individual expression and community aesthetics by raising the level of
scrutiny under which to consider the exercise of the state’s police power.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
If courts were to determine that architecture is a protected artistic
genre like painting, music, or poetry, then it would receive some level of
First Amendment protection. 73 Assuming architecture would pass this
initial inquiry, the court would then look specifically at the governmental
ordinance interfering with free speech. Under an expressive conduct
analysis, 74 the court must first consider if the ordinance specifically
discriminates against a particular kind of message (a content-based
regulation) or applies regardless of the communicative impact of the
message (a content-neutral regulation). 75 Content-based ordinances
invite strict scrutiny because they directly target protected speech.
Content-neutral ordinances regulating nonspeech (in this instance,
residential homebuilding) are subject to less exacting scrutiny because
they directly address conduct with “‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’

73. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). In
some instances, a homeowner might successfully argue that the architectural design meets the
second threshold inquiry for expressive conduct. A homeowner could intend to portray a certain
message, and it might be reasonably certain that the particularized message would be understood.
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). However, classifying architecture as a traditionally
protected artistic genre is the stronger and more broadly applicable claim.
74. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); see also Johnson, 491 U.S. at
397.
75. Justice Scalia articulates why content-based regulations are unconstitutional, even if they
proscribe speech that generally only receives minimal protection. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377 (1992). He writes, “The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing
speech, or even expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.” Id. at 382. To
illustrate the difference between content-neutral and content-based laws, Scalia sets forth the
following example: “A State might choose to prohibit only that obscenity which is the most patently
offensive in its prurience—i.e., that which involves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity.
But it may not prohibit, for example, only that obscenity which includes offensive political
messages.” Id. at 388. See also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 189 (Winter 1983).
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elements.” 76 If an ordinance is content neutral, the court would next
consider whether the ordinance advances an important governmental
interest. 77 The court would then balance the governmental interest
against the expressive interest, determining whether the ordinance
burdens speech not implicated by the government’s interest, 78 whether it
is disproportional to the interest, and whether alternative means of
expression exist. 79
As the balance of this discussion will show, ordinances prohibiting
excessive similarity or differences fail content neutrality. Content-neutral
aesthetic ordinances, like some community architectural style
regulations, fare better, but are still constitutionally suspect and turn on
the specific government and expressive interests at stake. Municipalities
with aesthetic zoning ordinances prohibiting nonconforming architecture
are interested in preserving the community aesthetic, preventing property
value decline, and protecting their citizens from exposure to distasteful
or offensive buildings. These interests are ill-suited to overcome a
homeowner’s interest in artistic expression through architecture, in part
because of the unclear impact on property values of the aesthetics of
neighboring homes; the First Amendment’s well-established protections
for offensive or distasteful speech; the importance of expression in one’s
residence; and the difficulty of providing reasonable alternate means of
expression.

76. United States v. O’Brien articulates the intermediate scrutiny standard well.
[G]overnmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to that interest.
391 U.S. at 377.
77. See id. at 376.
78. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 151 (1939).
79. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (“Expression,
whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner
restrictions.”).
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A. The Threshold Inquiry: Architecture as Art 80
1. Art receives First Amendment protection
Although the Supreme Court has devoted little analysis to artistic
expression, the sum of its holdings and dicta indicate that artistic
expression merits First Amendment protection. 81 First Amendment
protection of art, regardless of how clearly the art is understood, 82
illustrates that in certain contexts, self-expression and artistic expression
are constitutionally protected values. 83

80. For a somewhat disjointed distinction between visual art and architecture, see
Krasilovsky, supra note 14.
81. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995) (indicating that nonrational artistic forms are protected); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975) (disallowing a broad ban on nudity in movies because such a ban would
prohibit nudity that the court does not consider obscene, such as “newsreel scenes of the opening of
an art exhibit”); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining obscenity as lacking “serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501
(1952) (indicating that films “affect public attitudes . . . in a variety of ways, [including] the subtle
shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression.”); W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (“Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas.”);
Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Visual art is as wide ranging in its
depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book, treatise, pamphlet or other writing, and is
similarly entitled to full First Amendment protection.”).
82. Illustrative of the court’s de-emphasis on the clarity of the communication is the
“unquestionably shielded” protection of Lewis Carroll’s nonsensical Jabberwocky compared with
the diminished protection of clearly communicated commercial speech, or the lower protection for
communicative billboards compared to the high protection for abstract art. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at
569.
83. See id.; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (“In fact, words are often chosen as
much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution,
while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive
function which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall
message sought to be communicated.”). In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, Justice Souter
argued that art was protected under the First Amendment because of its expressive character, distinct
from any derivation from political speech. 524 U.S. 569, 602–03 (1998) (Souter, J. dissenting). He
wrote in dissent,
The constitutional protection of artistic works turns not on the political significance that
may be attributable to such productions, though they may indeed comment on the
political, but simply on their expressive character, which falls within a spectrum of
protected “speech” extending outward from the core of overtly political declarations. Put
differently, art is entitled to full protection because our “cultural life,” just like our native
politics, “rest[s] upon [the] ideal” of governmental viewpoint neutrality.
Id. (internal citations omitted). But see Rice, supra note 22, at 453 (arguing that the effect of the
architecture on the public is more important than its artistic intent).
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Clear language granting First Amendment protection to art is found
in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston. 84
The Court found that in certain traditional genres, “a narrow, succinctly
attributable message is not a condition of constitutional protection,” as
illustrated by First Amendment protection for “the unquestionably
shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or
Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.” 85 By using nonrepresentational
abstract visual art, discordant modern music, and irrational poetry as
examples of “unquestionably protected” expression, the Court reaffirmed
that the First Amendment protects “not only ideas capable of relatively
precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as
well.” 86 Despite minimal guidance from the Court about why certain
artistic forms like painting and poetry are “unquestionably shielded” 87
by First Amendment protection, the reason seems intuitive: merely
engaging in these activities is inherently expressive regardless of how
they are communicated to others. 88
Not all expressive activities receive First Amendment protection,
however, and legal lines bounding art are particularly dim. For instance,
with little explanation, the Court has given some types of dance First
Amendment protection, while leaving other types unprotected. In Dallas
v. Stanglin, the Court cursorily held that the weekend roller-disco
84. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 557. The Court upheld the petition of a gay rights group for
admission into the Boston St. Patrick’s Day parade. The city challenged the directive as a speech
compulsion. Id.
85. Id. at 569.
86. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26. Affirming this idea as it applies to traditionally protected genres
of expression, the Hurley court stated that constitutional protection is not forfeited by a speaker’s
failure “to edit [his or her] themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the
speech.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569–70. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court implicitly
acknowledged that communication is distinct from expression, and that the First Amendment
protects both the expressive and communicative components of traditional artistic expression. 491
U.S. 781, 790 (1989).
Music is one of the oldest forms of human expression. From Plato's discourse
in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own times, rulers have known its
capacity to appeal to the intellect and to the emotions, and have censored
musical
compositions
to
serve
the
needs
of
the
state.
. . . The Constitution prohibits any like attempts in our own legal order.
Music, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the
First Amendment.
Id.
87. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.
88. Hence, artistic expression is distinct from other forms of expressive conduct, which must
intend to convey a particularized message and must have a great likelihood that the message will be
“understood by those who [view] it.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (citation omitted).
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dancing of the petitioners was social rather than expressive and
consequently not protected by the First Amendment. 89 This distinction
between social dancing and expressive dancing points to some
requirement for expressive or artistic intent even within traditionally
expressive genres. As the Court articulated, “It is possible to find some
kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—for
example, walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping
mall—but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the
protection of the First Amendment.” 90 Decisions protecting artistic
expression are burdened with these line-drawing difficulties. 91 In some
instances, distinguishing art from non-art is easy; 92 in other instances,
the artistic nature of a piece may turn on the attitudes of the viewer. 93
Despite these difficulties, the Court seems to acknowledge elements of
artistry in expressive activity even if some forms of the activity may be
beyond the bounds of art. 94
Constitutional commentators acknowledge that the First Amendment
protects art, but they fiercely debate the level of protection artistic
expression should receive. Many commentators consider artistic

89. City of Dallas v. Stanglin 490 U.S. 19 (1989) (challenging a Dallas ordinance that
established age limits and limited hours of operation for certain types of dance halls).
90. Id. at 25; see also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (rejecting the idea
that “an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea”).
91. See supra note 79.
92. For instance, a court would have little difficulty distinguishing drip paintings by Pollock
from drips on the tarp below a house painter. While the materials used are primarily the same, the
artistic intent and aesthetic sensibility of a Pollock painting distinguishes it as art. Art is intentional
as art, even if the exact definition remains elusive.
93. For example, in the controversy that embroiled the National Endowment for the Arts in
the 1980s, many members of Congress felt that Robert Mapplethorpe’s retrospective photography
exhibit including homoerotic pictures was pornographic, not artistic. NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,
574 (1998).
94. For instance, in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., the Court found that a municipal ordinance
prohibiting topless dancing was overbroad because it could implicate artistic topless dancing. 422
U.S. 922, 933 (1975). It stated,
“The local ordinance here attacked not only prohibits topless dancing in bars but also
prohibits any female from appearing in ‘any public place’ with uncovered breasts. . . .
Thus, this ordinance would prohibit the performance of the ‘Ballet Africains’ and a
number of other works of unquestionable artistic and socially redeeming significance.”
We have previously held that even though a statute or ordinance may be
constitutionally applied to the activities of a particular defendant, that defendant may
challenge it on the basis of overbreadth if it is so drawn as to sweep within its ambit
protected speech or expression.”
Id. (quoting Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 364 F. Supp. 478, 483 (D.C.N.Y. 1973)).
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expression important only as derivative or subservient to political
expression. 95 Cass Sunstein, for instance, sees diminishing levels of
protection as speech gets further from the “central concern of the First
Amendment, which, broadly speaking, is effective popular control of
public affairs.” 96 In his view, apolitical, noncognitive expression with
little communicative purpose, like most residential architecture, deserves
little constitutional protection. 97 Alternatively, Martin Redish contends
that one of the many purposes of the First Amendment is protecting
individual autonomy and self-fulfillment, which would include
“‘nonrational’ forms of communication [like music, art, and dance].” 98
One conclusion from this debate is clear: while artistic expression is
squarely within the bounds of the First Amendment, the Court’s failure
to define a clear test for what constitutes artistic expression creates
uncertainty about the level of protection a newly considered artistic
medium would receive.
Given the Court’s failure to define a clear test for determining if any
activity is protected as art under the First Amendment, the best way to
determine protection may be a simple comparison between protected
activities and potentially protected activities.
2. Architecture’s similarity to traditionally protected art
Like music, dance, and visual art, residential architecture can be a
highly expressive way to communicate lifestyle choices, political
stances, and individuality. 99 John J. Costonis, a First Amendment scholar
who has written extensively about aesthetic zoning, remarked that
architecture may “communicate ideas more effectively than does

95. See, e.g., Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful,
the Sublime, and the First Amendment, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 221, 222 (1987).
96. Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 603–04
(1986).
97. Id. Sunstein continues,
Speech that concerns governmental processes is entitled to the highest level of protection;
speech that has little or nothing to do with public affairs may be accorded less protection.
Second, a distinction is drawn between cognitive and noncognitive aspects of speech.
Speech that has purely noncognitive appeal will be entitled to less constitutional
protection. Third, the purpose of the speaker is relevant: if the speaker is seeking to
communicate a message, he will be treated more favorably than if he is not.
Id. (citations omitted).
98. Nahmod, supra note 95, at 243. (quoting M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS 58 (1984)).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 82–83.
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language. . . . [T]he architect [is] a poet who uses not words but building
materials as a medium of expression.” 100 Like many visual and literary
artists, many architects’ primary expressive purpose is to convey their
unique vision of reality. 101 Robert Venturi, a highly influential architect
and theorist, wrote that architecture “evokes many levels of meaning and
combinations of focus: its space and its elements become readable and
workable in several ways at once.” 102 He encouraged architects to use
“complexity and contradiction” 103 in architectural form to comment on
the complexities of modernity, “to accept an architecture based on the
richness and ambiguity of modern experience, [and] to deal with that
experience whose anomalies and uncertainties give validity to
architecture.” 104
A brief analysis of the quintessentially American architect, Frank
Lloyd Wright, 105 illustrates that architecture is inherently expressive, but
very difficult to categorize. An observer describing his organic style
wrote, “[O]rganic architecture is the expression in architectural terms of
an American intellectual tradition rooted in the transcendentalist
philosophy of Ralph Waldo Emerson . . . . [It] nurtures in the inhabitant a
keen awareness of nature’s rhythms . . . and of the social dynamics of
family and community life.” 106 As proof that the expressive nature of
architecture is more than just academic bravado, consider the testimony
of an occupant of one of Wright’s Usonian homes:
At first there is the quiet pleasure and thankfulness for being
surrounded by something so admirable to look upon—the four walls of
any of the rooms. Then comes the business of living. The need for
storage space is felt almost to desperation. . . . [Then] [c]omes a time of
rebellion, an anger at any dwelling-place that presumes to dictate how
its occupants live. . . . Possessions continued to be reduced. . . . In

100. JOHN J. COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENS: LAW, AESTHETICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE 94 (1989) (internal quotations omitted).
101. Nivala, supra note 48, at 307; see also Nahmod, supra note 95, at 223 (arguing that the
“visual artist, whatever the medium, expresses a view of the world” and that “[w]hen an artist
creates, she is shaping a new reality, a form to signify a feeling, and a certain order among
perceptions and sensations”).
102. ROBERT VENTURI, COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE 16 (1973),
quoted in Nivala, supra note 48, at 307 .
103. Id.
104. Id. at 41.
105. For pictures of Wright’s homes, see ALAN WEINTRAUB ET AL., FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT
HOUSES (2005).
106. DENNIS P. DOORDAN, TWENTIETH-CENTURY ARCHITECTURE 51 (2002).
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simplicity the individual comes at last to the place from which he
started, the human level. He recognizes that it is only as himself,
another created being, that he meets all creatures, animal or human. . . .
Beauty and truth co-mingle in this house. 107

Rather than simply expressing an architectural vision, this architectural
design dictated an Emersonian lifestyle.
The expressive nature of architecture is aptly explained by the House
Beautiful editor’s offended response to the Edith Farnsworth House by
architect Ludwig Meis van der Rohe. The home was a “single glassenclosed volume” incorporating the “minimalist aesthetic of abstract
modern art, an interest in industrial materials, and the elegant simplicity
of Japanese design.” 108 The editor viewed the design as an attack on the
American value of consumerism, writing: “They are all trying to sell the
idea that ‘less is more,’ both as a criterion for design, and as a basis for
judgment of the good life. They are promoting unlivability, [and]
stripped-down emptiness.” 109 As these examples illustrate, visionary,
iconoclastic homes communicate complex messages about their
designers and residents, in some ways, more effectively than words.
Religious architecture further illustrates architecture’s expressive
qualities and demonstrates architecture’s ability to magnify religious
experience. As architect and author Christian Norberg-Schultz wrote, “In
the Church [building], man’s understanding of the cosmos, as well as his
own
life
in
the
world
was
kept
and
visualized.
. . . Thus, the church illustrates what architecture is all about, and teaches
us how to use its language.” 110 Just as religious architecture is an

107. Id. at 176. Wright designed his series of Usonian homes to be affordable for the average,
middle-class family. Id.
108. Id. at 169.
109. Id. at 169–70 (internal citation omitted).
110. C. NORBERG-SCHULZ, THE CONCEPT OF DWELLING 72 (1985) (quoted in Angela C.
Carmella, Houses of Worship and Religious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to Landmark
Preservation and Architectural Review, 36 VILL. L. REV. 401, 403 (1991)) (internal quotations
omitted). Carmella provides a comprehensive look at the expressive qualities of religious
architecture. Id. In discussing the importance of religious architecture, two protestant thinkers wrote,
Architecture for churches is a matter of gospel. A church that is interested in proclaiming
the gospel must also be interested in architecture, for year after year the architecture of
the church proclaims a message that either augments the preached Word or conflicts with
it. Church architecture cannot, therefore, be left to those of refined tastes, the aesthetic
elite, or even the professional architect. If the gospel of Christ is worthy of accurate
verbal proclamation week by week, it is also worthy of faithful architectural
proclamation, where its message speaks year after year.
Id. at 471 (quoting D. BRUGGINK & C. DROPPERS, CHRIST AND ARCHITECTURE 1 (1965)).
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integral part of religious expression, residential architecture can be
integral to expressions of individual lifestyle choices and conceptions of
taste and beauty.
3. Limits on the analogy of architecture as art
Architecture does not easily fit into the jurisprudence that has grown
up around art and other expressive conduct. Its commercial nature and
functionality seem to distinguish it from more traditional artistic forms.
Additionally, some buildings might be so clearly functional and devoid
of expressive elements—tract housing, for instance—that they fall
outside the scope of First Amendment protection. Still, purely functional
residential building does not negate the importance of protecting
expressive, artistic architecture, like the iconoclastic designs described in
this Comment.
Some might attempt to distinguish traditional art from residential
architecture, because homeowners may not choose an original design.
Originality of design, however, is not required for First Amendment
protection given judicial precedent protecting duplicative, yet artistically
expressive, material. 111 Additionally, multiple motivations affecting
artistic expression (i.e., creating art for compensation) do not preclude
First Amendment protection; 112 this reality implies that a homeowner’s
concerns about cost do not minimize the artistic nature of his building
choice. Along similar lines, the artistic nature of architecture creates an
umbrella of First Amendment protection for both the homeowner and the
designing architect. Just as the First Amendment protects an author and a
book owner, 113 it should protect both the designing architect and the

111. “Nor, under our precedent, does First Amendment protection require a speaker to
generate, as an original matter, each item featured in the communication. Cable operators, for
example, are engaged in protected speech activities even when they only select programming
originally produced by others.” Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S.
557, 570 (1995).
112. See Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (2d Cir. 1996). The Court upheld First
Amendment protection for the street artists even though the artists were selling their art
commercially. The Second Circuit in Bery quoted the Supreme Court in Riley v. National Federation
of the Blind of North Carolina: “It is well settled that a speaker’s rights are not lost merely because
compensation is received; a speaker is no less a speaker because he or she is paid to speak.” Id.
(quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 801 (1988)).
113. As illustrative that First Amendment rights are not limited to the initial speaker, see
Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (upholding a teacher’s First Amendment
right to academic freedom to teach a controversial short story in public school).
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homeowner whose expressive interests are realized through a particular
architectural design.
Perhaps the courts’ failure to give architecture First Amendment
protection is because architecture’s practicality makes it distinct from
purely aesthetic art. Architecture’s dual purposes—combining both form
and function—might lead some to relegate it beyond the margins of the
First Amendment. But, as the occupant of Wright’s Usonian house
articulated, the functionality of architecture can make it more expressive
than traditional forms of art like sculpture or painting. 114 In addition to
providing a visual commentary about one’s beliefs, taste, or politics,
architecture expresses an owner’s lifestyle choices in unique ways.
The ambiguity in the Court’s distinctions between protected artistic
expression and unprotected conduct also poses unique problems for
classifying residential homes as art. Just as not all dance is artistic
expression, as one architectural theorist glibly remarked, not all buildings
are architecture. 115 True, the minority of buildings likely have the strong
expressive elements of homes like those of the Stoyanoffs or Reids. This
criticism, however, is likely true of most categories of activity that could
have an artistic element. On any given Saturday night, the number of
dancers akin to the disco roller-skaters in Dallas v. Stanglin 116 is
probably significantly greater than the number of dancers performing
Martha Graham or Bob Fosse. Still, the existence of unprotected, social
dance does not function to negate First Amendment protection provided
artistic dance. Similarly, expressive artistic architecture should be
protected despite the existence of homes—tract housing, for instance—
with few expressive elements.
All architecture, by definition, has expressive elements or kernels, in
Rehnquist’s words. 117 Individual design choices (siding versus brick 118

114. For instance, the French neoclassical architect Louis Boullée advocated “speaking
architecture” in which form indicated function. He designed a craftsman’s shelter shaped “like the
barrel hoops fabricated by a cooper.” DOORDAN, supra note 106, at xv.
115. ROBERT HARBISON, THE BUILT, THE UNBUILT AND THE UNBUILDABLE: IN PURSUIT OF
ARCHITECTURAL MEANING 7 (1991).
116. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
117. Id. Architecture has been defined as designing or building a material structure (usually
habitable) with aesthetic effect and which transcends mere function. John Hill, What is
Architecture?, http://www.archidose.org/Mar00/032700.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2005);
“Architecture,” Word Reference, http://www.wordreference.com/definition/architecture (last visited
Dec. 20, 2005). Even tract housing has elements for aesthetic effect—for instance, siding, paint, or
decorative embellishments. While these elements are purely for aesthetic effect, these “artistic”
kernels are too small to warrant First Amendment protection.
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or variations in color, for example) might not place purely functional
residential building within the purview of First Amendment protection.
However, by their nature and environmental context, the iconoclastic,
non-conforming designs discussed in this Comment are expressive in
emotional, non-rational ways comparable to protected artistic expression.
This Comment cannot supply a future court with a bright line rule for
distinguishing between true artistic expression and de minimis expressive
kernels to determine if the threshold inquiry for expressive conduct has
been satisfied. 119 Determining whether residential architecture is akin to
traditional artistic expression is necessarily a fact-bound inquiry; any
other approach would detrimentally oversimplify artistic expression.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is well
suited to this kind of balancing. Freedom of association cases, for
instance, often turn on the relative cohesion of the group advocating a
particular exclusionary policy; 120 similarly, First Amendment protection
for architecture may ultimately turn on the strength of the artistic intent
and expression of the architect or homeowner.
Recognizing, distinguishing, and evaluating the strength of artistic
intent and expressive purpose in architecture is difficult but still within
the competence of the courts. 121 This Comment now turns to the validity
of aesthetic ordinances restricting this protected category of speech.

118. Some communities do regulate these design choices to an exacting level. For instance, in
Georgia Manufacturing Housing Ass’n v. Spalding County, the court upheld an aesthetic zoning
ordinance requiring a 4:12 roof pitch. 148 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 1998). In Morrison v. Boutwell, the
court upheld, under rational basis review, the decision of an architectural review board to refuse a
homeowner’s request to use vinyl siding, because the prohibition was made clear in the lot’s
restrictive covenant. 717 So. 2d 427 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).
119. See supra note 117.
120. In Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, for example, the Court acknowledged the First Amendment
protection for “collective effort on behalf of shared goals,” but ultimately found that the
cohesiveness and clarity of the Jaycee’s message was insufficient to justify excluding women. 468
U.S. 609, 622 (1984). Alternatively, the Court upheld the rights of the Boy Scouts of America to
exclude gay scout masters because of the strength and clarity of the organization’s expressive
assertion that “homosexual conduct is not morally straight.” Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640, 651 (2000).
121. For instance, the Court distinguished between social dance and expressive dance in City
of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). As the court indicated in Bery v. City of New York,
“Courts must determine what constitutes expression within the ambit of the First Amendment . . . .
This surely will prove difficult at times, but that difficulty does not warrant placing all visual
expression in limbo outside the reach of the First Amendment’s protective arm.” 97 F.3d 689, 696
(2d Cir. 1996).
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B. Content Neutrality and Aesthetic Restrictions on Residential Homes
Having established that artistic expression deserves First
Amendment protection and that architecture can be artistically
expressive, this Comment now considers the effect of these conclusions
on the aesthetic zoning regulations discussed in Part II. If an affected
citizen were to challenge an excessive similarity and difference
regulation as a violation of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, a
court would likely find that such an ordinance unconstitutionally restricts
expression based on the content of the speaker’s message. Any alleged
similarity to content-neutral zoning ordinances restricting the locations of
sexually-oriented business is too tenuous to find excessive similarity and
difference ordinances content neutral. In contrast, courts will likely find
ordinances requiring conformity with a pre-existing community
architectural style neutral about the content of the message expressed in
the architectural design.
1. The content-neutrality inquiry
The appropriate inquiry for determining content neutrality asks
whether the architectural design endangers the government’s interests
because of the message that it communicates. 122 An ordinance or statute
is content neutral if its application is independent of the message being
expressed. 123 After such a determination, the court then applies
intermediate scrutiny, balancing the interests of the government against
the interest in protecting free speech. On the other hand, a content-based
ordinance would apply to certain speech discriminately depending on the
specific content of the speech. When applied to highly valued speech like
artistic expression, a content-based statute would almost categorically be
unconstitutional. As the Court held in Police Department of Chicago v.
Mosley, “[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content.” 124
For example, the Supreme Court held that a universally applicable
ordinance prohibiting noise above a certain decibel level was content
neutral. 125 Had the ordinance prohibited a specific genre of music—

122.
123.
124.
125.

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
Stone, supra note 75, at 189.
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
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protest songs, for instance—above a certain decibel level and left other
musical genres unrestricted, a court would find the ordinance content
based and consequently subject to strict scrutiny. In the latter example,
the government would have been impermissibly distinguishing between
types of music based on the content of the message expressed. In the
former example, the government’s ordinance incidentally burdened
speech while primarily regulating volume. Content-neutral restrictions on
speech are then subject to intermediate scrutiny.
2. Excessive similarity and difference regulations fail content neutrality
Excessive similarity or difference regulations are inherently content
based and, thus, unconstitutional. 126 Consider the former ordinance for
Lake Forest, Illinois. 127 By requiring new buildings to conform to the
surrounding neighborhood, the ordinance tacitly rejects experimental or
modern design in preference for the traditional look of the community.
The implicit nature of the preference does not preclude the ordinance
from a content-based classification. 128 These types of aesthetic
regulations are particularly questionable because the medium and
message of architectural expression are inexorably linked. 129 In that
sense, architecture is distinct from other content-neutral aesthetic
regulations restricting, for example, signs or billboards. 130 This
distinction becomes clear by comparing the content-neutral aesthetic
zoning ordinance prohibiting billboards upheld in City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent 131 with the prohibition on nonconforming architecture upheld in Reid v. Architectural Board of Review
of Cleveland Heights. 132 As one commentator articulated,
Unlike a billboard, where structure is merely a forum for a transitory
promotion, a building design conveys its statement in the arrangement
126. Very few governmental actions have passed strict scrutiny, particularly in First
Amendment analysis. The Supreme Court has found some content-based campaign finance statutes
constitutional under strict scrutiny, but in the vast majority of cases, strict scrutiny becomes
synonymous with unconstitutionality.
127. See supra text accompanying note 45.
128. As the Court indicated in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., “[T]he essence of
[content neutrality] is the need for absolute neutrality by the government; its regulation of
communication may not be affected by sympathy or hostility for the point of view expressed by the
communicator.” 427 U.S. 50, 67 (1976).
129. Poole, supra note 16, at 313.
130. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
131. Id.
132. 192 N.E.2d 74. (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
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of bricks and mortar. . . . Los Angeles did not care if the message was
“Vote for Vincent” or “Eat at Joe’s”; the focus was on the ugliness of
signs. In contrast, Cleveland Heights rejected Ms. Reid’s home design
precisely because they objected to her personal statement in glass and
concrete about a comfortable home environment. 133

Furthermore, in denying building permits, many communities have
justified their decisions based on the seeming neutrality of property
values rather than on the subjectivity of aesthetics and thus have
attempted to qualify their regulations as content neutral. For instance, in
denying Ms. Reid’s building permit in Reid v. Architectural Board of
Review of Cleveland Heights, the court held that, in addition to the lack
of conformity, the proposed home would set a precedent requiring the
approval of any “design not conforming to the general character of the
neighborhood,” diminish property values, and be generally detrimental,
now and in the future, to the neighborhood. 134 All of these effects are
secondary to the architectural review board’s initial valuation that the
house was aesthetically displeasing. 135 One commentator aptly
characterized this taste-based judgment as follows:
[The] property value [standard is] nothing more than an attempt to
measure (and impose) majoritarian taste. When a community says, “We
think a pyramid house will hurt our property values,” they are simply
saying that “enough people will find your house distasteful that it will
make our homes worth less.” Even if such a conclusion could be
proven, the fact remains that all government is doing is measuring
community distaste for the expression of an idea. 136

Laws prohibiting nonconforming architecture function to prohibit
unpopular expressions in architecture while allowing mainstream
architectural designs. This content-based prohibition is unconstitutional
because “the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech
in
ways
that
favor
some
viewpoints
. . . at the expense of others.” 137
Generally, a city’s concerns about the secondary effects of speech do
not give content-based regulations of highly valued speech a

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Poole, supra note 16, at 312–13.
192 N.E.2d at 77–78.
Poole, supra note 16, at 322–23.
Id. at 323.
Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804.
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constitutional pass, unless those ordinances also pass strict scrutiny. 138
However, in a confusing line of cases, the Supreme Court has found
ordinances targeting sexually oriented businesses content neutral based
on municipalities’ interests in prohibiting the negative secondary effects
of those businesses. 139 For example, in City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., the Court found that the zoning ordinance that facially
appeared to distinguish adult theaters from other types of theaters was
content neutral because the city council’s “‘predominant concerns’ were
with the secondary effects of the adult theaters.” 140 Since the ordinance
was primarily enacted because of concern about safety, property values,
neighborhood quality, and general quality of life inherently threatened by
adult theaters, the Court found the ordinance content neutral. 141
Based on Renton and the similar holding in Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., some commentators have argued that excessive similarity
or difference ordinances are content neutral because cities are primarily
concerned with the detrimental secondary effects of nonconforming
architecture. The argument proceeds that cities are only regulating ugly
or nonconforming architecture because of their reasonable belief that
these homes will detrimentally affect property values. 142 Similarly,
defendants of ordinances restricting sexually oriented businesses claimed
that the ordinances were content neutral because they focused on the
secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses, rather than on their
content.
This analogy is misapplied. First, the Court has been reluctant to
apply the secondary effects doctrine outside the realm of sexually
oriented businesses. 143 Second, even under the unlikely possibility that a
court would apply Renton to architecture; the secondary effects doctrine
is inapposite. Renton, as interpreted, distinguishes between regulations
138. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 62–63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. See id.; see also Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1986).
140. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. But see id. at 59–61 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that many
of the secondary effects are just alternate ways of expressing disapproval of adult-theater content and
that the language indicating concern over secondary effects was added after a law suit was filed
challenging its constitutional validity).
141. Id. at 48 (majority opinion).
142. Under this argument, the city is not required to conduct any independent analysis of
architecture on property values. In Renton, the city was only required to base their justification on
reasonable belief that the ordinance will have a positive effect on their substantial government
interest. Id. at 51–52.
143. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1988); see also id. at 334–38 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (indicating his displeasure with the majority’s assumption that the secondary effects test
could apply outside the context of sexually oriented businesses).
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based on the “secondary [effects] . . . associated with [a] type of
speech,” 144 which are content neutral, and regulations based on the
“direct impact” of speech, which are content based. 145 This hair-splitting
distinction makes a limited amount of sense if one considers that only
patrons receive the direct communicative effect of an adult movie
theater’s content; the negative secondary effects occur outside of the
theater and are arguably disassociated from the content playing inside. 146
In contrast, it is impossible to separate the effects of architecture into
direct and secondary categories because buildings and their inherent
message or “content” are both immediately in the public space. 147
In short, the failure of an analogy between ordinances targeting
sexually oriented businesses and excessive similarity or difference
ordinances leaves the latter without a constitutional escape route to avoid
a content-based judgment. Excessive similarity and difference ordinances
are content based because they distinguish on the basis of the messages
communicated by nonconforming residential architecture.
2. Community architectural style regulations more likely pass content
neutrality
Regulations based on community architectural style are more likely
to pass the content-neutrality inquiry than are regulations based on
excessive similarity or difference. The distinctions between these two
sister ordinances are small but significant. Community architectural style
ordinances require particular designs in particular neighborhoods, but, at
their best, still provide a place for nonconforming architecture. In Coral
Gables, Florida, for instance, the carefully designated architectural style
was first adopted through private restrictive covenants and then later
codified in the community charter. 148 Codifying an architectural style for
a specific neighborhood in a community’s comprehensive plan removes
much of the subjectivity from an architectural review board’s decision144. Id. at 321 (majority opinion).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 320 (“The content of the films being shown inside the theaters was irrelevant and
was not the target of the regulation.”).
147. Id. at 321. O’Connor splits hairs in a comparable way in her opinion. She imagines an
ordinance justified by the city’s desire to prevent the psychological damage it felt was associated
with viewing adult movies. Then, she argues, analysis of the measure as a content- based statute
would have been appropriate. The hypothetical regulation targets the direct impact of a particular
category of speech, not a secondary feature that happens to be associated with that type of speech.
Id.
148. See supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text.
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making process. The enforcement of these provisions does not call for a
taste-based assessment of the progressive home design by the
architectural review board. As one commentator argued, community
architectural style regulations do not label nonconforming architecture
inferior to the community style, but instead implicitly communicate,
Your pyramid design home is unacceptable, not . . . because it is
distasteful, but because our community plan for architectural styles
calls for a Dutch colonial house in that particular location. If you want
to build a contemporary style house, build it in those areas of the city
where there are other contemporary designs. 149

Similar to ordinances designating specific areas for performing arts,
sculpture gardens, or protests, these regulations can be interpreted as
content-neutral restrictions as long as the city still provides for a
reasonable, alternative location for the nonconforming home. 150
The comprehensiveness and forethought of a community-wide plan
for architecture are the distinguishing factors between the majority of
excessive similarity or difference regulations and community
architectural style regulations. 151 Unlike excessive similarity or
difference regulations, which reify the majority of the community’s
tastes after a neighborhood has developed its own ad hoc architectural
style, 152 regulations designating a specific community architectural style
give architectural review boards an objective standard on which to base
their decisions and provide notice to potential land purchasers
concerning the acceptability of their designs. Furthermore, as explained
149. Poole, supra note 16, at 332.
150. The trouble with this argument, as this Comment will analyze more fully, see infra note
185 and accompanying text, is that the city of Coral Gables has no place for contemporary design.
151. This distinction is supported by the Court’s analysis in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954). In justifying the government’s redevelopment plan, the Court argued, “If owner after owner
were permitted to resist these redevelopment programs on the ground that his particular property was
not being used against the public interest, integrated plans for redevelopment would suffer greatly.”
Id. at 35. The distinction is further supported by the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Kelo v. City
of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). The Court reaffirmed the legitimacy of comprehensive
planning in communities.
[T]he City is endeavoring to coordinate a variety of commercial, residential, and
recreational uses of land, with the hope that they will form a whole greater than the sum
of its parts. . . . Given the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough deliberation
that preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of our review, it is appropriate for us . . .
to resolve the challenges to individual owners . . . in light of the entire plan.
Id. at 2665.
152. Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 192 N.E.2d 74, 80 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) (Corrigan,
J., dissenting).
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above, the forethought involved in planning for and providing areas in
which iconoclastic homes can be built properly accounts for the interests
of the community while preserving the First Amendment interests of
homebuilders and architects with unique tastes.
Specific community architectural style ordinances pass the contentneutrality test. Although excessive similarity or difference regulations
appear to be content based, there is value in considering both types of
ordinances in the balance of the First Amendment analysis.
C. Significant Governmental Interest
Upon determining that an ordinance is content neutral, the next step
in the First Amendment analysis requires a court to weigh the strength of
the government’s interests in the regulation against the strength of the
expressive interests at stake.
The Court gives a great deal of deference to the power of
municipalities to implement zoning restrictions since zoning is possibly
“the most essential function performed by local government . . . [as] one
of the primary means by which we protect that sometimes difficult to
define concept of quality of life.” 153 As discussed in Part II, aesthetic
considerations fall squarely under the broad scope of the general welfare,
justifying a governmental regulatory scheme. 154 Additionally,
communities may have various, significant interests that justify aesthetic
zoning. For instance, traffic safety could be implicated by a particularly
distracting building design or color in a high-traffic area. 155
Architecture’s permanence strengthens most governmental interests
in aesthetic zoning against those of a single, transitory property owner.
As one commentator conjectured, “Should we fail to act in a unified,
well directed manner in our demand for aesthetic concepts . . . the
eyesores of today will exist and multiply in the years to come.” 156
Justice Brennan discussed this unique trait of property in his dissent in
Nolan v. California Coastal Commission:
Property does not exist in isolation. Particular parcels are tied to one
another in complex ways, and property is more accurately described as

153. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 80 (quoting Vill. of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 24–33.
155. Tappendorf, supra note 38, at 962–64.
156. Sheldon E. Steinbach, Aesthetic Zoning: Property Values and the Judicial Decision
Process, 35 MO. L. REV. 176, 186 (1970).
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being inextricably part of a network of relationships that is neither
limited to, nor usefully defined by, the property boundaries with which
the legal system is accustomed to dealing. 157

The city skylines in New York and San Francisco illustrate Brennan’s
point; these cityscapes arise on private property through private capital,
but affect all city residents. In a way, skylines become “‘urban symbols’
of each city’s citizens’ collective identity.” 158 On a smaller scale,
neighborhood residents have a similar investment in the aesthetics of
their residential community. The government’s interest in protecting the
communal aesthetic would likely be a particularly strong justification for
a community architecture style regulation, given the forethought and
planning that distinguish these ordinances. On the contrary, in a
community marked with an ad hoc architectural style, the interest of
preserving a communal aesthetic would seem weak and disingenuous.
The government also has a significant interest in protecting the
property values of the surrounding community. The government has
recognized the impact of aesthetics on property value in takings claims,
providing homeowners compensation for obstructed views, for
example. 159 Even so, claiming depressed property values is an unstable
hook on which to hang an ordinance restricting speech. Property values
do not hinge on any single consideration. 160 The neighborhood
characteristics that affect house price assessments include police
response statistics, school quality, and the age and size of the
surrounding homes. 161 Such characteristics indicate that other factors

157. 483 U.S. 825, 863–64 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting ) (quoting Joseph L. Sax, Takings,
Private Property, and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 152 (1972)).
158. Georgette C. Poindexter, Light, Air, or Manhattanization?: Communal Aesthetics in
Zoning Central City Real Estate Development, 78 B.U. L. REV. 445, 505. (quoting Spiro Kostof, The
Skyscraper City, 140 DESIGN Q. 32, 47 (1988)).
159. George P. Smith, II & Griffin W. Fernandez, The Price of Beauty: An Economic
Approach to Aesthetic Nuisance, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 53, 77–80 (1991). The article cites La
Plata Electric Ass’n v. Cummins in which the Colorado Supreme Court valued an obstructed view in
a takings claim based on comparative sales data. Id. at 78 (quoting La Plata, 728 P.2d 696, 700).
Additionally, in Keinz v. State, the court commented that the valuation of a view “may be a matter of
judgment but it is also a matter of dollars and cents.” Smith & Fernandez, supra at 79–80 (quoting
Keinz v. State, 2 A.D.2d. 415, 417 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956)).
160. See 1 WILLIAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 46, §§ 9.01–.25 (quoted in Regan, supra note 26,
at 1013 n.3).
161. Thomas G. Thibodeau, Marking Single-Family Property Values to Market, 31 REAL EST.
ECON. 1, 22 (2003). The design of neighboring homes may have some effect on property values, but
the effect is not particularly clear. Consequently, other markers are used for assessing property
value.
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have more to do with housing prices than the design of a neighbor’s
home. 162
In sum, the government does have important interests at stake in
aesthetic zoning regulations. First, courts have recognized a particularly
strong interest in community-wide zoning. Second, architecture’s
permanence gives the government a greater interest in considerations
about housing placement and the social acceptability of architectural
design. Finally, property values are an important consideration with
aesthetic zoning, although this justification may not be as compelling as
many might intuitively think.
The final inquiry in an expressive conduct analysis requires a court
to weigh the government’s interests in aesthetic zoning against the free
speech rights of prospective homeowners.
D. Balancing the Government’s Interests Against
the Free Speech Rights of Homeowners
In balancing the government’s interests against the free speech rights
of architects and future homeowners, three considerations are
particularly noteworthy: first, the invalidity of prohibitions on offensive
speech; second, the Court’s special concern about expression in the
home; and finally, the government’s narrow interest in protecting
unwitting observers from offensive speech. First Amendment
jurisprudence is particularly sensitive to protecting minority views and
expression in the home, which gives iconoclastic residential architecture
particularly significant weight when balanced against governmental
interests. While the Court has expressed reluctance to subject unwilling
observers to offensive speech, these concerns minimally apply to
residential architecture and are unlikely, on their own, to tip the balances
in the government’s favor. The governmental interests in ordinances
requiring conformity to a preexisting architectural style may outweigh a
homeowner’s expressive interests if nonconforming architecture is
permitted in some residential zone within the jurisdiction. On the other
hand, even if ordinances prohibiting excessive difference or similarity
were to pass a content-neutral inquiry, a municipality’s interests in these
regulations do not outweigh the homeowners’ expressive interests in
building nonconforming architecture.

162. Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 192 N.E.2d 74, 79 (Ohio 1963) (Corrigan, J.,
dissenting).
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1. Invalidity of speech prohibitions on offensive speech
Outside the context of First Amendment jurisprudence, the
importance of community beauty clearly resonates with most people and
with the Court, as evidenced by its holding in Berman v. Parker. 163
However, the First Amendment stands as a bulwark against the
imposition of the subjective tastes of the majority on the minority.
Without fail, the Supreme Court has held that offensive or distasteful
speech is still fully protected speech. 164 As Justice Blackmun argued in
defense of sexually explicit speech in adult bookstores,
The presumption of validity that traditionally attends a local
government’s exercise of its zoning powers carries little, if any, weight
where the zoning regulation trenches on rights of expression protected
under the First Amendment. . . . [I]n attempting to accommodate a
locality’s concern to protect the character of its community life, the
Court
must
remain
attentive
. . . to the protection . . . afford[ed] to minorities against the
“standardization of ideas.” 165

In essence, the Court’s unwillingness to uphold speech restrictions based
on the offensiveness or distaste of the speech strips purely aesthetic
zoning of much of its validity in comparison to individual expression.
First Amendment precedents upholding offensive, ugly, and insulting
speech undermine a municipality’s objections to offensive,
nonconforming architecture embodied in both excessive similarity or
difference ordinances and community architectural style ordinances.

163. 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)
164. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 601 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466
U.S. 485, 505 (1984); Chi. Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message
[or] its ideas.”); see also Marks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308, 311 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[P]rivate
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect.” (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984))). The Marks court distinguished offensive
speech, which is fully protected, from obscene speech, which is not protected under the First
Amendment.
165. Nivala, supra note 48, at 314 (quoting Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,
77, 79 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949))).
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2. The special importance of expression in the home
Also weighing in favor of a potential homeowner seeking to build an
atypical home is the Court’s “special respect for individual liberty in the
home” and “a person’s ability to speak there.” 166 In striking down an
ordinance prohibiting residential signs, the Court found that while
regulating the public forum is a “constant and unavoidable” task, the
government has a much less pressing need to regulate expression at a
private home. 167 City of Ladue v. Gilleo is particularly relevant to this
discussion because the homeowner’s anti-war signs were offensive to
some in her community, yet her free speech rights were upheld in part
because of the importance of preserving expression in the home.
Expression at one’s residence, either through lawn signs or artistic
architectural design, is particularly important because it constitutes a
uniquely intimate reflection of the occupant.
3. Minimal captive audience problems with atypical residential
architecture
In evaluating particularly distasteful speech, the Court is attentive to
the public’s ability to avoid the offense. 168 When offensive speech is “so
intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it,” 169 the “deliberate
‘verbal or visual assault’ . . . justifies proscription,” regardless of the
speech’s message. 170 The importance of protecting speech usually means
“tolerat[ing] insulting, and even outrageous, speech” 171 in the public
sphere. On the other hand, the Court held in Frisby v. Schultz that the
sanctity of the home has outweighed free speech rights when a
substantial privacy interest has been invaded in a particularly intolerable
way. 172 Again, the permanence of architecture strengthens the
government’s position—it is very difficult to avert one’s eyes in one’s
own home to avoid seeing a pyramid-shaped house across the street.
166. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994).
167. Id.
168. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1975); Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405, 412 (1974); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office
Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970).
169. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487
(1988).
170. Hill, 530 U.S. at 716. (quoting Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 210–11 n.6).
171. Id. at 751–52 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.
N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 383 (1997)).
172. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484; Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 210.
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While the permanence of architecture would strengthen the
government’s argument, the captive audience justification for these
aesthetic regulations is unlikely to apply. First, it is questionable whether
even really ugly architecture would constitute a “visual assault” akin to
abortion picketers (where the captive audience justification has been
most recently applied). 173 Second, the privacy invasion that so
concerned the Court in Frisby does not occur with expressive
architecture; a neighbor may confront an iconoclastic home design upon
entering or existing their home, but would not be bombarded with the
offensive image within the sanctity of their home. 174 Finally, the Court
has applied the captive audience justification sparingly—passersby at an
adult drive-in movie theater were instructed to avert their eyes, as were
courthouse patrons when assaulted by particularly offensive language
emblazoned on a jacket. 175
Unknown variables—both a future court’s disposition and possible
facts of a future test case—preclude any conclusive statement about
whether the government’s interests in regulating community aesthetics
would outweigh the expressive rights of a residential property owner.
However, the invalidity of regulations prohibiting offensive speech, the
questionable implication of offensive architecture on surrounding
property values, and the particular importance of expression on one’s
own property all weigh against the constitutionality of excessive
difference or similarity ordinances.
Ordinances requiring harmony with a community architectural style
fare a little better in this constitutional balancing. In these instances, the
government is protecting a preexisting plan, which reflects buy-in from
the existing residents. Consequently, communities like Coral Gables,
Florida, have a stronger interest in protecting the communal aesthetic.
The constitutionality of regulations protecting a community architectural
style may turn on the availability of alternative modes of expression for
iconoclastic home builders.

173. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 383; Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483.
174. In Frisby, the ordinance prohibiting picketing an individual home was upheld because of
the importance of residential privacy and because the ordinance allowed the protesters ample
alternatives. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484.
175. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (Cohen’s jacket read, “F*** the draft.”);
Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209.
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E. Time, Manner, and Place Restrictions on Residential Homes
The final inquiry in a First Amendment expressive conduct inquiry is
whether reasonable alternative avenues of expression exist. If such
avenues exist, the speaker’s expressive interests are less burdened and
the government regulation is generally upheld. However, given the
unique nature of architectural expression, blurring message and medium,
it is doubtful whether comparable expression could occur less
obtrusively. 176
Even when evaluating a political message expressed through
architecture, such as a rainbow-painted exterior in support of gay rights
or an environmentally efficient home built with recycled materials, it is
difficult to imagine that the expressive statement could be made another
way with the same magnitude. Using one’s home for personal expression
is literally a Whitmanesque pronouncement from the rooftops. 177
Could, however, a city require that an unconventional home be built
in a different residential zone? The Court has consistently upheld zoning
regulations that severely limit building spaces for businesses peddling
offensive speech. 178 In doing so, the Court disregarded the economic
hardship this requirement would place on the businesses. 179 Even with
businesses, however, reasonability requires some place for expression
within the bounds of the municipality. 180 Ordinances prohibiting
excessive similarity or difference that apply city-wide effectively exclude
nonconforming architecture from the municipality. The lack of an
alternative avenue of expression cuts the final thread by which excessive
similarity or difference ordinances could remain constitutionally intact.

176. Confronted with the argument that medium and message were inextricably connected in
Ward v. Rock against Racism, the Court still upheld noise regulation. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). While
the volume of their music surely contributed to the intensity of their communication, the lyrics and
sound were still expressed even with the volume regulation. In contrast, asking an architect
designing environmentally conscious buildings with recycled materials to instead use a recycling
sign or bin conveys an entirely different message.
177. WALT WHITMAN, Song of Myself, LEAVES OF GRASS, reprinted in THE WALT WHITMAN
ARCHIVE (Ed Folsom & Kenneth M. Price eds.), available at http://www.whitmanarchive.org (last
visited Dec. 20, 2005).
178. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (holding that an adult
movie theater had a reasonable alternative venue because the city's zoning ordinances allowed the
theater on approximately five percent of the city’s land); see also Rice, supra note 22, at 466.
179. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54; see also Scott D. Berghold, Effective Zoning of Sexually Oriented
Business, in PROTECTING FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LAND USE
LAW 37–38 (Daniel R. Mandelker & Rebecca L. Rubin eds., 2001).
180. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54.
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Ordinances protecting the coordinated aesthetic of a community may
be less suspect because, depending on the city, alternative zones may
allow nonconforming architecture. 181 In such instances, a time, place, or
manner restriction on speech seems particularly apropos since the zoning
ordinances dictate where speech can occur rather than directly regulating
the content of the speech. 182
With time, manner, and place restrictions, permanence and the
special character of real property weigh in favor of the prospective home
owner. The prospect of requiring a private landowner with nontraditional
architectural tastes to uproot, with little regard for economic impact, is
unsettling. Even if a homeowner knew of the ordinance prior to
purchasing land, requiring one designated neighborhood with all that
entails in terms of school choice, commuting time, etc., seems a
particularly high price to pay for an unconventional house. The unique
nature of property, homeowners’ important expressive interests, and
lesser regulatory concerns for residences compared with commercial
property might make a time, place, or manner restriction unreasonably
burdensome. Since First Amendment inquiries are predominantly factbound, the constitutionality of community architectural style regulations
is unclear, but suspect.
Stretching the boundaries of First Amendment protection to include
some residential architecture is difficult but necessary given the
important expressive and artistic interests at stake. Acknowledging First
Amendment interests in residential architecture will not always lead a
court to dismiss a municipality’s interest in aesthetic zoning. The
acknowledgement does, however, require intermediate scrutiny and a
careful weighing of community and individual interests. Were a court to
consider ordinances prohibiting excessive similarity or difference with
surrounding architecture, it would likely find such ordinances
unconstitutional. Even if these ordinances were able to pass the contentneutrality inquiry, the interests of an individual homeowner would still
likely outweigh governmental interests at stake. Ordinances requiring
conformity to a preexisting community architectural style fare a little
better under constitutional scrutiny but remain suspect because of the
181. The example ordinance from Coral Gables, Florida, applies city-wide however. If the
prohibition on nonconforming architecture was just created through municipal law, free speech
would probably require the city to grant a nonconforming home design a building permit. However,
since each deed in Coral Gables had a restrictive covenant, the city might still be able to exclude
nonconforming housing.
182. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
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difficulties of providing alternative avenues of expression for
iconoclastic architecture.
IV. POLICY BENEFITS OF RAISING THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Regardless of how a particular aesthetic zoning ordinance fares after
an expressive conduct inquiry, there is inherent value in providing
expressive residential architecture First Amendment protection, because
it raises the level of judicial scrutiny in favor of the homeowner. This
added level of scrutiny would protect minority interests against the
dictates of majoritarian tastes, would encourage architectural creativity
and innovation, and would encourage the passage of well-considered,
constitutional zoning ordinances.
When I discussed this Comment with classmates, the most typical
reaction was, “Fine in theory, but I don’t want some ‘expressive’
monstrosity next door.” This view generates some sympathy; however,
one of the purposes of the First Amendment is to guard against such
majoritarian dictates. A vibrant marketplace of ideas requires the
majority to tolerate the outrageous speech found on the periphery in
order to provide “adequate breathing space” for the core of First
Amendment protection. 183 Creating a legacy of artistic tolerance is much
more important for our democratic heritage than codifying the tastes of
architectural review boards. 184
In response to concerns of my classmates, providing First
Amendment protection for architecture is unlikely to lead to a pyramidshaped house on every square block, or even every town. Cases in which
architectural designs are rejected for nonconformity or “grotesque
design” are uncommon. In Coral Gables, Florida, for instance, the
architectural review board requires “style conformity” with the existing
community; however, most complaints focus on the board’s laxity rather
than their strict enforcement. 185 Iconoclasm is rare, particularly in

183. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 56 (1988)).
184. See Lee Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438, 460 (1983)
(arguing that “[f]or speech that attacks and challenges community values, the act of toleration serves
both to define and reaffirm those values; the act of toleration implies a contrary belief, and
demonstrates a confidence and security in . . . the community norm”). While Bollinger’s analysis
applies more directly to political speech, in this case, architectural “tolerance” would hopefully
reaffirm liberalism and tolerance for individual expression over community conformity.
185. Poole, supra note 16, at 302.
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architecture because of its functionality. 186 As Venturi stated, “If order
without expediency breeds formalism, expediency without order . . .
means chaos.” 187 He warns that “no architect ‘can belittle the role of
order as a way of seeing a whole relevant to its own characteristics and
context.’” 188 In short, given the infrequency of nonconforming
architecture, the aesthetic zoning ordinances discussed above may be
more damaging to our collective artistic health than an infrequent
“grotesque” design in a traditional neighborhood.
Indeed, there may be benefit to the simple acknowledgment that
architecture is art. In a landscape of homogeny and globalization, judicial
recognition of architecture as an expressive medium might awaken future
“McMansion” 189 owners to a diverse array of architectural possibilities.
It would be a shame if overly stringent and subjective aesthetic zoning
laws led to self-censorship of new architectural innovation. 190
By clearly drawing expressive architecture within the ranks of
protected speech, municipalities would likely jettison subjective aesthetic
ordinances, negotiate more readily with landowners over iconoclastic
home designs, and pursue litigation only when their aesthetic regulation
was of particular importance to the broader community. The affect of
providing heightened scrutiny to zoning laws impinging upon First
Amendment interests is apparent with the effects of the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). 191 With the law’s
passage, Congress provided churches with a much larger stick with
which to combat municipal zoning ordinances; in doing so, Congress
186. DOORDAN, supra note 106, at xii (“Architecture begins as a process of design that gives
form to a wide range of aesthetic and cultural issues, and concludes as a process of construction
intimately connected with economic and material concerns.”). See Poole, supra note 16, at 339.
[Another] logical reason for infrequent litigation is the preselection of community by a
builder. People who have strong and distinctive preferences in architectural design and
lifestyle may be disinclined to select a building site in a community that actively enforces
a contrary design preference. . . . [A] person who favors a radical architectural design
may prefer the eclectic setting of Coconut Grove over the highly regulated Coral Gables.
The relatively strong economic disincentives to build architecturally unpopular buildings
and the community intimidation factor (that continues independent of regulation)
suggests that no excessive difference ordinances are much ado about very little.
Id.
187. Nivala, supra note 48, at 337 (quoting VENTURI, supra note 102, at 41).
188. Id.
189. CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 529 (David L. Callies et. al. eds., 2004).
190. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758 (1988) (overturning a city
ordinance giving the mayor unbridled discretion to approve or deny newspaper rack displays on
government property because of censorship concerns).
191. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000CC to 2000CC-5 (2000).

1664

4HAWS.FIN.DOC

1625]

3/14/2006 5:22:05 PM

First Amendment Protection for Residential Architecture

tipped the balance from favoring community interests to favoring
individual rights. 192 Because of RLUIPA, churches have more
negotiating power with municipal governments. Judicial recognition of
the artistry in some residential architecture would create the same policy
benefits for potentially expressive homeowners.
Finally, there are other ways of ensuring architectural conformity
without impeding First Amendment rights. 193 For instance, a
neighborhood could adopt a restrictive covenant insisting on conforming
architectural styles. Restrictive covenants by private agreement are
preferable to conformity by governmental decree. 194 To offset a
provable impact on property value by an aesthetically displeasing house,
a second possible, but more controversial, option is to allow a private
cause of action for aesthetic nuisances. Permanent damages, as provided
in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., might be a feasible solution to
possible property devaluation while still allowing the aesthetically
offensive property owners creative control, so to speak. 195 Courts,
however, have been reluctant to recognize aesthetic nuisances. 196 These
solutions may not be ideal, but considering the shaky ground on which
some aesthetic zoning currently stands, new ideas are in order. Providing
intermediate scrutiny to residential architecture could serve to catalyze
new thinking about aesthetic zoning, in addition to stimulating
architectural creativity.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the rubric this Comment has established, the Stoyanoffs
would be able to build their pyramid-shaped home in Landue, Missouri,
because, not in spite, of its expressive nonconformity. As explained
above, excessive similarity or difference regulations are not content
neutral as required to protect free speech. Furthermore, the governmental
interests justifying their enactment are outweighed by the expressive

192. See John J. Dvorske, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 181 A.L.R. FED. 247 (2002); James L. Dam, Churches
Use New Federal Statute To Win Zoning Cases, LAW. WKLY. USA, available at
http://www.lawyersweeklyusa.com/alert/usa/zoning.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
193. I offer these examples as departure points for further study, not necessarily optimal
solutions. They each have their own unique advantages and disadvantages.
194. Regan, supra note 26, at 1029–31.
195. Smith & Fernandez, supra note 159, at 65 (quoting Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (N.Y. 1970)).
196. Id. at 66–67.
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interests of future landowners under intermediate scrutiny. Community
architectural style regulations fare a little better but are still on tenuous
constitutional ground. While the governmental interests in protecting the
communal expression of a community aesthetic are stronger with these
regulations, they may still be suspect because of the difficulty of
providing alternative avenues for architectural expression.
Despite this conclusion, applying current First Amendment analysis
to architecture is an uneasy fit. This incongruity is perhaps because, as
Justice Rehnquist stated, the Court’s treatment of zoning board
regulations facing free speech challenges have been “a virtual Tower of
Babel, from which no definitive principles can be clearly drawn.” 197
Adding further complication is architecture’s permanence which,
coupled with the local government’s interest in protecting the aesthetic
environment as a whole, might be the subtext for why the Court has yet
to acknowledge architecture as art.
However, skirting the artistic nature of architecture does not do
justice to our liberal heritage of free expression or to our communal
interests. Extending First Amendment protections to landowners with
truly expressive intent would provide the freedom to build and
potentially create innovative residential housing. Furthermore, it would
prevent local municipalities from implementing poorly conceived,
subjective land use ordinances. Aesthetic regulations, for good or ill, are
now a permanent part of local government’s zoning schemes; raising the
bar for their legitimacy will help ensure the vitality of constitutionally
viable regulations and also protect free expression.
Janet Elizabeth Haws

197. Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 569 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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